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False Security: How Courts Have Improperly Rendered the Protections of the Protective
Order Illusory
Ramona L. Lampley[1]
The protective order is perhaps one of the most useful and “taken for granted” discovery devices
contemplated by the Colorado and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In civil litigation, in which
confidential, proprietary, and trademark information is routinely demanded through written
discovery requests, the parties often ward off heated discovery disputes through the entry of a
joint protective order.[2] The purpose of this type of protective order is to permit the parties to
produce business information—for example, information concerning the design and testing of a
particular product—without fear that the information will be disseminated publicly, and with a
court order that the information be used only for purposes of the present litigation. The United
States Federal District Court for the District of Colorado discussed the usefulness of such
“blanket” protective orders in Gillard v. Boulder Valley School District Re.-2,[3]
Blanket protective orders serve the interests of a just, speedy, and less expensive determination
of complex disputes by alleviating the need for and delay occasioned by extensive and repeated
judicial intervention. In view of increasingly complex cases and the existing workload of the trial
courts, “[b]lanket protective orders are essential to the functioning of civil discovery. [A]bsent
[such orders], discovery would come to a virtual standstill....”[4]
Other courts have recognized that these “blanket” protective orders, designed to permit discovery
into confidential information without fear by the producing party of its public dissemination,
have become the “standard practice” in “complex cases,” because they enable the discovery
process to “operate more efficiently.”[5]
Although these “blanket” protective orders are often entered into by the parties’ agreement and
are orders of the court, enforceable by sanctions or contempt, many practitioners and clients may
place undue reliance on the protective order’s seemingly firm restrictions on disclosure. In some
jurisdictions, such as the Tenth Circuit, the standard for modification of a protective order, even
by an intervening non-party after the end of the litigation, is more lenient than many clients
realize at the time the protected documents are produced.
The seminal case in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals is United Nuclear Corporation v.
Cranford Insurance Company.[6] In United Nuclear, the defendant insurance companies entered
into a protective order with the plaintiff, who sought a declaration of liability under the
environmental impairment insurance policy issued by the defendants.[7] The protective order
declared all discovery materials to be confidential and prohibited their use or disclosure other
than for preparation for or use at trial. The parties in the underlying litigation produced

documents in reliance on this protective order.[8] Pursuant to the settlement agreement,
documents produced by the defendants were to be retained at United Nuclear’s expense for ten
years.
Three years after the case settled and the district court dismissed the suit with prejudice, litigants
in other lawsuits around the country seeking determination that they had coverage pursuant to
Cranford and International’s insurance policies moved to intervene in United Nuclear for the
purpose of modifying the protective order. In essence, these non-party litigants sought to modify
a protective order in a case in which they were not involved, after the case had been dismissed, in
order to obtain from United Nuclear documents produced by Cranford and International in
reliance on the protective order. According to the intervening litigants, they sought access to the
discovery in United Nuclear to avoid duplicating that discovery in their respective cases.[9] The
defendants opposed the modification of the protective order. The court’s stated reason for the
defendant’s opposition to the modification was “to make it more burdensome for [the]
Intervenors to pursue their collateral litigation.”[10] The case did not discuss what methods, if
any, the Intervenors had made to obtain this discovery of this information from the defendants
Cranford and International through traditional means of discovery.
The Tenth Circuit first recognized the importance of such blanket protective orders to the
efficiency of civil discovery and complex litigation. The court also recognized that a number of
federal courts have adopted a “presumption in favor of the continued integrity of the protective
order,” permitting modification only under extraordinary circumstances.[11] However, the
Tenth Circuit declined to adopt this presumption, and instead held:
[W]here an appropriate modification of a protective order can place private litigants in a position
they would otherwise reach only after repetition of another’s discovery, such modification can be
denied only where it would tangibly prejudice substantial rights of the party opposing
modification. Once such prejudice is demonstrated, however, the district court has broad
discretion in judging whether that injury outweighs the benefits of any possible modification of
the protective order.[12]
This framework has been referenced by collateral litigants in later cases seeking to obtain
discovery they could not otherwise obtain through a third-party who became privy to the
information via a protective order.[13] And some litigants have misconstrued the Tenth Circuit’s
holding in United Nuclear and the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Wilk as creating a presumption in
favor of modifying a protective order to avoid repetitious discovery, unless the party resisting
production (the party who presumably relied on the protective order) can show it would
“tangibly prejudice” its “substantial rights.” Although the United Nuclear court’s holding did
contain strong language suggesting that a protective order should be modified, it was based on
the facts of that case, in which the defendant’s only basis for contesting the modification was the
“desire to make it more burdensome for Intervenors to pursue their collateral litigation.”[14]
Litigants and courts who construe the language set forth above in United Nuclear as creating a
presumption in favor of modification of a protective order for any collateral litigants do an
injustice to the remaining language of the case, and to the importance of the protective order as a
necessary discovery measure in complex litigation. First, the United Nuclear court also

recognized that once the opponent to modification has demonstrated that modification would
prejudice its substantial rights, “the district court has broad discretion in judging whether that
injury outweighs the benefits of any possible modification of the protective order.”[15] In cases
in which parties produce discovery to an opposing party in reliance on a protective order, it is
difficult to envision how modification would not prejudice the producing parties’ substantial
rights. The producing party has an expectation of confidentiality, and based on this expectation,
produces to the other party confidential, perhaps, proprietary business information relevant to
that underlying lawsuit only. For an adversarial party in unrelated litigation to attempt to obtain
that discovery, produced pursuant to a protective order, via the collateral adversary instead of
through normal discovery procedures, is to effectively lift any gate-keeping function of the court
in the collateral litigation in confining discovery to the scope of Rule 26. If litigants were aware
that discovery produced, pursuant to a protective order, to an opposing party could then be
subject to a subpoena by an adversary in another case, and possible production by that initial
adversary, document production would screech to a halt in many complex cases.
Perhaps the United Nuclear court recognized this possibility when it acknowledged that, “a
collateral litigant has no right to obtain discovery materials that are privileged or otherwise
immune from eventual involuntary discovery in collateral litigation.”[16] The problem, of
course, arises in enforcing these restrictions under the framework of a subpoena to a third-party,
who was at one time, adversarial to the party opposing production.
Therefore, to the extent the United Nuclear court failed to recognized, in 1990, the extreme
consequences of diluting the protections offered by a protective order in a civil case by
subjecting it to post-litigation modification, that decision should be modified. Other courts have
already begun to retract from case law that suggested protective orders could be easily modified
after the litigation had ceased. For example, the United Nuclear court relied heavily on Wilk v.
American Medical Association[17] in adopting Wilk’s holding that modification of a protective
order designed to prevent repetitious discovery should only be denied where it would tangibly
prejudice the opposing parties’ substantial rights.[18] This portion of Wilk, directly relied on by
United Nuclear, was based on the presumption that, “as a general proposition, pre-trial discovery
must take place in the [sic] public unless compelling reasons exist for denying the public access
to the proceedings.”[19] According to the Wilk court, “[t]his presumption should operate with
all the more force when litigants seek to use discovery in aid of collateral litigation on similar
issues.”[20]
However, the Seventh Circuit has recently eroded Wilk’s premise that pre-trial discovery should
take place in the public absent compelling reasons. In Bond v. Utreras,[21] the Seventh Circuit
stated that
[t]o the extent . . . that these cases [referencing Wilk] are premised upon a principle that “pretrial discovery must take place in ... public unless compelling reasons exist for denying the public
access to the proceedings,” they have been superseded by the 2000 amendment to Rule 5 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.[22]
Thus, the Bond court appropriately recognized that, “Pre-trial discovery [tools]... ‘are not public
components of a civil trial,’ ‘were not open to the public at common law,’ and ‘in general, are

conducted in private as a matter of modern practice.’”[23] Because there is no public right of
access to information exchanged between private litigants in pre-trial discovery, the entire
premise of Wilk and its progeny (including United Nuclear) is called into question.
Thus, if this issue is re-addressed in the Tenth Circuit, the court will presumably examine the
authority in other jurisdictions, including the Seventh Circuit, retracting from a standard that
allows modification of protective orders without a showing of exigent circumstances.[24]
Further, if Colorado courts address a similar situation, in the present age of mass discovery
production, one would hope that Colorado courts would adopt the Second Circuit’s standard of
requiring extraordinary circumstances. Although no court has set forth a list of factors that may
present exigent circumstances, one would think that the intervening party seeking to modify the
protective order in order to obtain documents produced in collateral litigation would be required
to show that it cannot obtain that discovery by other means. In short, a party should not be
permitted to circumvent the normal discovery procedures in litigation by obtaining modification
of a protective order that was previously relied upon by an adversary in a different case.[25]
For present day purposes however, it would behoove practitioners and their clients to be wary of
relying too much on the perceived protections of a blanket protective order. One knows not who
may seek to modify that protective order and obtain discovery from one’s adversary in litigation,
in the future. Until Wilk and its progeny are modified, that possibility looms on the horizon.
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